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Relations in Europe’s migrant societies are polarizing. Groups of citizens in countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands increasingly grow apart. Extreme right groups and parties blatantly express and disseminate xenophobic and Islamophobic ideas, while among migrants – particularly Muslims – a growing Westernphobia, frustration, and anger can be observed. Cleavages between ethnic Dutch and migrants, between “us” and “them,” seem to enlarge and clashes between the two opposing groups easily flare up. This intergroup conflict is fueled not only by local and national conflicts, but certainly also by “explosive import products” such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or the war in Iraq (Etty, 2009). In the Netherlands the polarization between ethnic Dutch and Muslims has provided fertile soil for radical actions. The dynamic is dramatically demonstrated by the murder of Theo van Gogh by a young Moroccan, shortly after Van Gogh directed a film about the repression of Muslim women. In response to this attack, rightist racists burned mosques and Islamic schools. Equally alarming, though less visible, is the radicalization of the public debate. Consider, for instance, the sharp and fiery public debates on headscarves, the Danish cartoons, the movie Fitna by populist politician Geert Wilders, and especially the murder of Van Gogh. 
While our knowledge of why people undertake radical actions is rather elaborated (see Chapter 10 by Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, Chapter 11 by de Koning and Meijer, and Chapter 12 by Blee in this volume; also Moghaddam, 2005), how and why public debates sharpen is poorly understood. Perhaps because public debates are elusive and sequential, radicalization of these debates is hard to grasp. How do we examine whether “flaming and blaming” (Oegema, Kleinnijenhuis, Anderson, & Van Hoof, 2008) intensifies or declines in ongoing discussions and conversations? To complicate matters even more, radicalization is a collective phenomenon. If conflicts flare up, the locus of self-definition shifts from “I” to “we” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We conceive of radicalization as an instance of movement/counter-movement interaction. The opposing groups develop their ideas and actions in reaction to each other and the perceived opposition (Touraine, 1985). Just as, for instance, the pro-life and the pro-choice movement “kept each other alive” (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996), ethnic Dutch and Muslims appear to develop their beliefs and ideas in reaction to each other. Both groups assert that what “we” stand for is threatened by “them,” tribute is paid to in-group symbols and values, and the out-group is derogated. In such “relational conflicts” group members define themselves in opposition to other conflicting groups. The societal context is differentiated into opponents and allies (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Bystanders are forced to choose sides in a conflict, which does not allow the comfort of neutrality. They become allies or must accept the consequences of being deemed an enemy. You are either with us or against us. This seems to result in antagonistic intergroup relations, whereby intergroup interactions intensify and opinions, views, and feelings sharpen back and forth. Hence, two interrelated but different group processes are nested in the process of radicalization: politicization and polarization. In terms of the public debates, this implies that opinions and feelings within the respective groups politicize and radicalize while the debates between the opposing groups polarize. How to examine such processes as they evolve?
The Internet – particularly Web forums – is a “place” where the dynamics of radicalizing public debates can be observed. Newly developed techniques make it possible to study the content of group discussions as they evolve on the Internet over time. What is more, the social structure in society tends to be reflected in the social structure of the Web forums; that is, Muslims interact on Islamic forums, and ethnic Dutch on nationalistic forums. Computerized content analyses of opposing Web forums provide a suitable method to examine radicalizing public debates in society over time. In this chapter we describe a study in which we examine the content of two opposing Dutch Web forums (ethnic Dutch vs. Dutch Muslims). Opposing forums are computer-mediated conversational arenas that can be seen as a digital reflection of – or even part of – public debates. On these Web forums ethnic Dutch and Muslims discuss, converse, and quarrel about – among other themes – socio-political issues such as immigration and integration. We examined the content of these two forums from October 2003 to April 2006. This time period includes several severe incidents (e.g., the murder of Van Gogh and the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London) that made the intergroup conflict flare up. This enabled us to examine when ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims felt the urge to discuss such political issues as integration and immigration, and what they talk about. In other words, to assess how the respective public debates change as a function of the ebb and flow of a protracted intergroup conflict. 
No Radicalization without Identification
We conceptualize radicalization as a collective response in the context of intergroup conflict. It roots in fear and frustration about group-based feelings of social exclusion and perceived threats (Berting, 2010). People do not radicalize on their own but as part of a group in which a collective identity is developed. Intergroup interactions intensify, while opinions, views, and feelings sharpen. Radicalization and intergroup conflict are in this sense interpreted as a collective process. It is an intergroup process in which identification processes interact with characteristics of the socio-political context to shape and mold trajectories of change in individuals and groups (see Chapter 9 by Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans in this volume).
We maintain that social identification processes are crucial to radicalization. But what makes individuals feel, think, and act as group members? Tajfel and Turner (1979) have shown that social categorization according to some trivial or “minimal” criterion such as the “blue” or the “red” group suffices to make people feel, think, and act as a group member. Compared to this minimal group paradigm, real-world intergroup conflicts can be seen as “maximal group paradigms” that bring group membership powerfully to mind. According to social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its successor, self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), the cognitive-motivational basis of intergroup behavior contains three components: social categorization, self-enhancement, and social identification. In order to achieve a stage of “social identification,” two social psychological processes need to be in place: social categorization (seeing oneself as similar to some group of people and different from others), and self-enhancement (the process of seeing one’s own group as positive in relation to relevant out-groups). Hence, on the one hand, social identification is strengthened via social categorization which makes people more aware of their group membership (McGarty & Grace, 1996), while on the other hand, social identification is strengthened via self-enhancement (e.g., Turner et al., 1987).
Social categorization is a cognitive tool for the ordering of the social environment in terms of groups and helps people to define their place in society (Turner et al., 1987). People have many social identities that remain latent most of the time. A particular identity is salient if it is “functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behavior” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 118). SCT hypothesizes that depending on contextual circumstances a transition from “I” to “we” as locus of self-definition occurs (Turner, 1999). 
In reaction to threatened social identities, group members try to enhance their social self-esteem by searching for positive group distinctiveness, because any threat to the position of the group implies a potential loss of positive comparisons (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In these processes of self-enhancement groups are assigned certain stereotypical attributes and an evaluation of these attributes, such that “our” attributes are positively evaluated and “their” attributes are negatively evaluated. These biased intergroup attitudes create a meta-contrast between in-group and out-group which enhances people’s social self-esteem (Haslam & Turner, 1995; Turner et al., 1987). Groups polarize because group members converge to more extreme positions so that it most clearly differentiates the in-group from the contextually relevant out-group (McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 1992). This polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as “pro” or “con,” allies or opponents. An external enemy is blamed for the group’s predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled against this enemy. The collective identity fully politicizes if in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government) or the general public (cf. Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The more politicized group members are more likely to engage in collective action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or to take sides. The more a group perceives a threat to its identity, the more its members are motivated to reach consensus on the definition of the situation, and the degree of freedom of group members to choose what to do, think, or feel decreases (cf. Moghaddam, 2005), resulting in collective definitions of the situation. 
In sum, we assign identification processes a prominent role in the radicalization of public debates. We assume that identity-threatening incidents spur social identification. On the one hand, social categorization makes people more aware of their group membership, which strengthens their social identification. On the other hand, due to processes of self-enhancement, group members attempt to “repair” their self-esteem through in-group favoritism and out-group derogation, which subsequently strengthens their social identification. By portraying “us” as good and “them” as evil the debate radicalizes and simultaneously creates a push for distinctiveness by which the groups drift apart and polarize. In case of a protracted intergroup conflict, one may assume that each new incident, like a terrorist attack, will start off the whole process again. Importantly, from incident to incident, social identification becomes stronger and ideas and feelings become more radical. This cyclical mechanism may radicalize the debate and widen the cleavage between groups. This echoes Moghaddam’s (2005) staircase metaphor. According to this metaphor, radicalization is a collective intergroup process which gradually proceeds through several stages in which polarization and politicization play a pivotal role. 
Radicalizing Debates on Two Opposing Web Forums
Now that we have described theoretically what we mean by radicalizing debates, how do we expect to observe and measure these processes on the web forums? Inspired by agenda setting research on issue salience, we start with coding words as representative of a concept. The presence of coded words is used as an indicator to characterize the debate (e.g., the presence of such words as “Dutch” and “Muslims” indicates social categorization, the occurrence of “We as Muslims” indicates identification). By simply counting how often such words appear on the respective forums over time the occurrence and change over time of a specific concept is measured. The dynamics of radicalizing debates can thus be observed by mapping the presence of coded words over time. We employed computer assisted content analysis to find and count the coded words. Owing to space constraints we cannot elaborate on this method, but we refer readers to van Atteveldt (2008). 
In order to show the impact of intergroup incidents on radicalizing debates, the amount of attention for object was calculated per week. On some points we expect an absolute increase, for example in the amount of discussion (expressed in the number of words). On most points, however, we expect a relative increase or decrease in attention, for example for extreme actors, issues, and emotions. For this reason, we calculated how often the objects were mentioned per 10,000 words. Mean attention for objects on both forums during the week of an event and the three following weeks is contrasted with the mean number in all other weeks. This procedure is applied for four events: the attack in Madrid, the one in London, the murder of Van Gogh, and the Danish cartoons. These cartoons were included because they evoked violent protests in several Arab countries and terrorist threats especially in Denmark, but also in the Netherlands, particularly at the start of 2006. In order to facilitate comparison, the changes are expressed as the percentage of increase or decrease after the events. 
From October 1, 2003 to April 30, 2006, we collected literally thousands of postings of an ethnic Dutch Web forum (40,051 postings of NL.politiek) and a Dutch Muslim web forum (17,768 postings of Marokko.NL). NL.politiek counted more than 40,000 participants and the content of the forum suggests these are mostly younger white males with a high involvement in politics, with predominantly rightist, conservative preferences. Marokko.NL counted 89,000 participants, and was especially popular among young Dutch Moroccan students (90 percent of the registered participants are between 15 to 30 years of age) (Marokko Media, 2004). 
We assign identification processes a pivotal role in radicalizing debates. The basic idea is that after an intergroup incident, debaters articulate:

<nlist>
1	Social categorization: mention the relevant groups.
2	Social identification: express identification with their in-group.
3	Self-enhancement: repair their self-esteem by portraying us as good and them as bad.
</nlist>
Social categorization 
Attention for social categories is measured by counting how frequent social categories such as ethnic, religious, and national groups are mentioned (e.g., “Muslim,” “Dutch,” “Moroccans”). One may expect that events in the social-political context like the attacks in Madrid bring the relevant social identities powerfully to the psychological foreground; that is, the respective social categories become more salient in the news and the relevant social categories will be more frequently mentioned in the Web forums. That is exactly what we see: compared to normal periods (without an incident) the mentioning of “Muslims” or “Dutch” increases by 9 percent on NL.politiek and on Marokko.NL by 11 percent in the four weeks after an incident. Interestingly, though, attention on NL.politiek decreases for their own category (−15 percent), whereas attention for the category Muslims increases (32 percent). On Marokko.NL we see that the attention for both categories increases (13 percent ethnic Dutch and 9 percent Dutch Muslims). This corresponds with Hegarty and Pratto’s (2001) findings that people tend to focus more on minorities when they want to explain (identity-threatening) situations. 
Social identification
Attention for social identification is measured by counting the frequency of expression of being a member or not being a member of one of the relevant groups. So, merely mentioning a group is not enough; a direct expression of belonging or not belonging is required. Identification with the in-group could be expressed as “I, as a Dutchman” or “we Muslims.” In many cases the identification is negatively expressed as “you Moroccans” or “those Muslims.” Although these direct expressions of (non-)membership are relatively scarce, the tone is easily recognized in a statement like “again those Moroccans, I am tired of it.” In the four weeks after an incident the number of expressions of (non-)membership with the in-group or the out-group changes on average to 27 percent. On Marokko.NL, debaters mention ethnic Dutch as out-group 33 percent more often, and they also refer to Muslims as an in-group more often (24 percent). On NL.politiek, debaters’ reference to Muslims as an out-group increases by 19 percent, whereas reference to ethnic Dutch as an in-group decreases by 31 percent. Hence, in times of intergroup conflict, positive in-group and negative out-group identification seem to differ for dominant and subordinate groups. Whereas group members of the dominant ethnic Dutch group display more out-group derogation rather than in-group favoritism, members of the subordinate Muslim group display both more in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. This corresponds with the findings of Leonardelli and Brewer (2001), who found that members of subordinate groups have a greater need to affirm membership than members of dominant groups. In-group favoritism helps members of subordinate groups to affirm their threatened in-group. Translated to our findings on the Web forums, this seems to imply that after an incident, dominant ethnic Dutch, “just” want to be clear that Dutch Muslims are an out-group, whereas subordinate Muslims have a greater need to define their out-group and to affirm their threatened in-group.
Self-enhancement
In a reaction to potential group threat, ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims feel the urge to “repair” their social self-esteem. These processes of self-enhancement can be observed by changes in their intergroup attitudes. Intergroup attitudes are composed of a behavioral, cognitive, and affective component. 
Behavior. First and foremost, people want to reach consensus on the definition of the situation: “What is going on?” Therefore, one may expect that both for ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims their degree of participation, expressed as the mean number of words exchanged by a group in a week, will increase. And indeed, after an incident, the degree of participation increases strongly for both groups: 55 percent for the ethnic Dutch and as much as 98 percent for the Moroccans. Also, the number of participants in the discussion boosts: a 43 percent increase for NL.politiek, and 86 percent for Marokko.NL. People also interact at a slightly higher rate (an individual sends 10 percent more postings per week on Marokko.NL and 14 percent more on NL.politiek). 
Figure 13.1 relates the amount of participation to the events that took place in the period under study. The amount of discussion in both forums between October 2003 and April 2006 is expressed as the number of words in the postings about immigration and integration. 

<Insert Fig. 13.1 near here>

Obviously, the online discussion shows a strong response to the three major terrorist attacks during this period. The attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 introduced large-scale terrorism to Western Europe. The line for Marokko.NL shows a slight but clear peak at this point in time. The postings for NL.politiek are missing on the Web archives for this month.​[1]​ The murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by the Dutch Moroccan Mohammed Bouyeri (Mohammed B.) – a participant on Marokko.NL – on November 2, 2004 introduced terrorism to the Netherlands and clearly dominates the debate for a long period and generates a strong, lasting growth of the Moroccan forum. A few months earlier, Van Gogh had produced with Hirsi Ali the critical, provocative film Submission, about Islam and the position of women. The third, more modest peak is observed after the attack on the London Underground. The memorial of the murder of Van Gogh leads to another peak, especially on NL.politiek, and the Dutch Muslims react especially to the “provocation” of the Danish cartoons in the first months of 2006. People are strongly motivated to air their views and to find out what exactly happens after an incident. Moreover, from incident to incident, the ethnic Dutch and Moroccan debates appear to drift further and further apart. This can be inferred from the fact that after an incident participation levels peak, but they do not return to a lower level than before the incident. Especially for the Dutch Muslim forum, the cleavage between Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch seems to widen from incident to incident. This obviously says nothing about the actual content of the debates. To examine the content of the debate we will turn our attention to extreme cognitions and emotions in the postings. 
Cognitions. Next to behavioral changes, SIT would predict that “reparation” of self-esteem induced by processes of self-enhancement can be observed in changes in cognition. That is, one can observe an increase in extreme expressions – references to extreme actors and extreme issues. Examples of extreme actors are Theo van Gogh, Pim Fortuyn, Mohammed B. (murderer of Theo van Gogh), and Samir A. (Samir Azzouz, the leader of the so-called Hofstad group; see Chapter 11 by de Koning and Meijer in this volume). Extreme issues are strong deviations from norms in society. In the context of this study, only the issue of terrorism is labeled as extreme. The use of deadly violence for political or religious goals as a means of imposing fear on people is a clear violation of Western norms. Attention for cognitions is measured by counting how frequently issues and actors are mentioned in a text. In total, a list of over 500 different search keys was used to discern the relevant clusters of actors and issues. The actors were clustered in extreme actors (e.g., Dutch Islamic extremists, rightist extremists, anti-immigrant parties and politicians like Fortuyn, Verdonk, Wilders, and Hirsi Ali) and political actors (e.g. politicians and parties, ministers). The issues were clustered in: terror (e.g., terrorism, Al-Qaeda), Islam (e.g., mosque, jihad), criminality (e.g., crime, criminals), demands on new immigrants (e.g., language courses, residence permits), position of Muslim women (e.g., equal rights for women, headscarf), immigration issues (e.g., asylum seekers, refugees), and foreign conflicts (e.g., in Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan). 
We define radicalization of cognitions as increased attention for extreme actors and issues on the forums. And indeed, after incidents, the attention for extreme issues increases for NL.politiek and Marokko.NL by 37 percent and 52 percent, respectively. The Moroccan forum also shows an increase of 30 percent in the attention for extreme actors after incidents, but NL.politiek shows virtually no increase (2 percent). The rightwing extreme actors consist especially of politicians (Fortuyn, Hirsi Ali, Verdonk, and Wilders), whereas Muslim extreme actors are extremists that used violence (Mohammed B. and Samir A.). This asymmetry is typical for this debate: on the right, a small number of politicians dominates the debate. Extreme right activists (like neo-Nazis) attract relatively little attention. The Muslim side reveals the reverse: here the attention is concentrated on a small number of extremists who were involved in (the planning of) terrorist incidents, while politicians who can represent the Dutch Muslim minority in public and political debate are hardly visible. 
There is also another, more structural shift in the agenda that can be typified pessimistically as a narrowing of the mind or more optimistically as a focusing of the agenda. The amount of attention for the top ten issues, the ten issues that get most attention, grows after incidents. In the online discussion of the ethnic Dutch, the attention for this top ten is normally 35 percent and this rises to 47 percent. In the Moroccan forum the focus is normally already very strong (49 percent), but this hardly changes after an incident (51 percent). The more a group perceives a threat to its identity, the more its members are apparently motivated to reach consensus on the definition of the situation, and the degree of freedom of group members to choose what to do, think, or feel decreases (cf. Moghaddam, 2005), resulting in collective definitions of the situation. President Bush’s claim in the US Congress shortly after 9/11 offers a classic expression of such a dynamic: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Groups polarize because group members converge to an extreme position so as to most clearly differentiate the in-group from the contextually relevant out-group (cf. McGarty et al., 1992). All in all, both the focus on a smaller set of objects and the shift to more extreme objects seems to indicate radicalizing cognitions. 
Emotions. Finally, emotions play a role in self-enhancement processes whereby individuals “repair” their self-esteem. An intergroup conflict in which the out-group constitutes a threat to the in-group evokes emotions of fear, anger, and hatred (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Rivera, 2007). Being fearful, angry, or full of hate are different emotional experiences. Fear is a primary aversive emotion that arises in situations of perceived threat and danger (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). It causes great mistrust and delegitimization of opponents and is a major platform for violence. People are angry, on the other hand, when they experience an unfair or illegitimate situation for which they can blame someone else who could have acted otherwise, but with the expectation that they are able to do something about it (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Walker & Smith, 2002). Anger is assigned an important role in driving action against those responsible, which makes anger the approach-emotion of fight or attack (Averill, 1983; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Hatred is a direct reaction to protracted harm perceived as deliberate, unjust, and stemming from the hated group (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). Hate delegitimizes the out-group and facilitates a clear distinction between the out-group and the in-group (Bartlett, 2005): people want the out-group to be eliminated, which makes hatred one of the most vicious motivational forces in conflicts (Sternberg, 2008). The main difference between anger and hate is that people experience anger when they feel efficacious and hate when they feel incompetent or weak. 
Emotions are straightforwardly measured by counting how frequently they (and their synonyms and variants) are mentioned in a debate. Obviously, severe intergroup incidents such as terrorist attacks evoke fear, anger, and hate, observed on the Web forums by an increased mention of fear, anger, and hate. Normally, in periods without incidents, these three negative emotions are mentioned about equally in both forums, although fear prevails more on the forum of the ethnic Dutch. After an incident, the number of emotions mentioned increases much more on Marokko.NL (24 percent) than on NL.politiek (9 percent). On Marokko.NL, fear rises only slightly (9 percent) after incidents, but anger (26 percent) and especially hate (39 percent) increase strongly. Fear not only prevails more on NL.politiek, but it also increases strongly after incidents (17 percent), more so than anger (1 percent) and hate (11 percent). The more prominent role of fear in the ethnic Dutch discussions may reflect the fact that all terror attacks are targeted at the ethnic Dutch, not at the Moroccans. These results suggest that radicalizing public debates are inherently emotional. 
Which actors and issues are “hot” and which are not?
We have described the reaction to intergroup incidents by an increased attention for social categorization and social identification, and an increased attention for extreme actors and issues fueled by emotions signifying processes of self-enhancement; they all seem to signify processes of radicalization. From this point on, we will elaborate on the relations between these processes. We will start with the role of cognitions, because they play a pivotal role in the debate. Indeed, each public debate has the form of a set of actors and issues that is discussed. Every actor and every issue offers unique opportunities to trigger social categorization and identification processes and to evoke emotions. In Table 13.1 feelings, social categorization, and identification are related with the issues and actors that are discussed in the respective debates. The first data column in Table 13.1 shows the attention for these issues and actors; that is, for the agenda of the online discussion. The ethnic Dutch have a stronger focus on political actors (23 percent), such as political parties, the cabinet, and the government, than do the Moroccans (14 percent). Marokko.NL and NL.politiek pay, respectively, 28 percent and 35 percent of their attention to the extreme parts of the agenda (as the sum of the attention for extreme actors and terror). For the Moroccans, the issue of Islam strongly dominates the agenda (28 percent). Notwithstanding these clear differences, the two agendas are also linked to each other; for instance, by the focus on the extreme issues. The two agendas as presented in the first data column correlate 0.41 with each other, suggesting that these two debating groups are connected to each other as parts of a movement and counter-movement. 

<Insert Table 13.1 near here>

The sixth column in Table 13.1 (total emotions) reveals which issues and actors are cold and which are hot. How hot an actor or issue is, is defined by how often the emotions of fear, anger, and hate are mentioned in the postings that discuss that actor or issue. On the ethnic Dutch forum, Islam evokes most emotions (11.5 times per 10,000 words), followed by the position of women, demands on new immigrants, extreme actors, and extreme issues. At the Moroccan forum the extreme actors elicit most emotions, closely followed by Islam. Demands on new immigrants and terror are hot issues as well. Every issue and every actor evokes its own unique set of emotions. In the second, third, and fourth data columns the proportion of attention for each of the three emotions is calculated. On both forums the variation in anger is smaller than the variation in hate and fear. On NL.politiek, terror evokes relatively little anger (34 percent), and fear is the dominant response (42 percent). On this forum, hate is important in postings about new immigrants and about Islam. On Marokko.NL, hate is often mentioned in postings about extreme actors and also in postings about demands on new immigrants. Such a pattern is often observed in prejudice: if superiority is threatened, fear can undergo transformation into hatred and violence (Dozier, 2003). Hence, Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch talk more about Muslims while the issues become more similar: the position of women, Islam, terrorism, and demands on new immigrants. The groups differ, however, in terms of the emotions they display. Although the four issues in general appear to evoke anger in both forums, they evoke more fear for the ethnic Dutch (particularly the issue of terrorism) and more hate for the Muslims (particularly the issue of demands on new immigrants). Ethnic Dutch are afraid of terrorism, which evokes fear. Fear causes great mistrust and delegitimization of opponents and is a major platform for violence (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). But how is it possible for an emotion like fear – typically characterized by aversive and flight tendencies – to be related to radicalization – typically characterized by approach and fight? Participating in online debates may be qualified as “therapeutic” social in-group involvement rather than extremely violent acts against opponents. Intensification of social sharing and social interaction was found after the attacks in Madrid (Páez, Basabe, Ubillos, & González-Castro, 2007), but after the murder of Theo van Gogh we also observed Dutch natives setting fire to Islamic schools and mosques. Hence, collective coping can take different forms. It might well be that the more “therapeutic” form correlates with fear, whereas more violent forms correlate with hate or anger. Dutch Muslims hate the ethnic Dutch for the more stringent demands on new immigrants, causing social exclusion. Both fear and hate delegitimize “the other” and facilitate a clear distinction between “us” and “them.” The more debaters feel the need to defend threatened identities, the more they display self-enhancement processes by describing their rival in negative, “hot” cognitions. By portraying “us” as good and “them” as evil the debates radicalize and simultaneously create a push for distinctiveness by which the groups drift apart and polarize. 
The politicization of identities can be observed as the extent to which ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims are mentioned in postings about political issues and actors. These groups are most often mentioned on NL.politiek in the debate about the position of Islamic women. Mentioning of identification scores also high for this issue (mentioned 2.6 times per 10,000 words; see Table 13.1, last column). The position of women is a minor issue, however. This is not the case for Islam, which triggers the mentioning of groups as well as identification. For the Moroccans, the demands on new immigrants, such as obligatory language courses, evoke the strongest identification, probably because they perceive these new policies as a form of discrimination and as an identity imposed on them. The more ethnic Dutch express identification, the more they mention terror; for strongly identifying Moroccans, it evokes especially the mentioning of groups. Moreover, attention for emotions (Table 13.1, sixth column, “total emotions”) is strongly related to attention for ethnic Dutch and Muslim groups and expressions of identification.​[2]​ The stronger people express identification, the more they think and feel for “us.” 
The formation of consensus follows similar lines on both forums. The opponents disagree about virtually all issues and actors involved. But at the same time they discuss a similar agenda, and they mention groups and identify in similar ways in reaction to the actors and issues on this agenda. Extreme actors particularly evoke strong emotions on both forums, but terror, Islam, and the position of women are other hot issues. Table 13.1 nicely illustrates the group dynamics of the involved ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims: identifying with a group leads to adopting more characteristics of that group and colors the way one perceives the world. This suggests that group members not only come to agree on what to think about a certain issue or actor, but also on what to feel about these issues and actors. Taken together, these results confirm our proposition that identification processes are pivotal for radicalizing debates. Moreover, consensus formation not only implies that people come to share cognitions, but emotions as well. Although this is perhaps not very surprising, we believe that we are the first to have documented such a process of dual consensus formation. This is important because the affective component seems to function as an accelerator and an amplifier when it comes to the translation of cognition into action (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). In other words, consensus on radical cognitions is amplified by shared emotions and turns into radical action accelerated by the same shared emotions. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate the social psychological dynamics of radicalizing online public debates. To sum up, devastating events such as the attacks in Madrid and London, or the murder of Theo van Gogh, are clearly the talk of the town, and in “virtual cafès.” Our results indicate that people do not just talk randomly about these events, but in a predictable manner. We have attempted to catch radicalization in the texts that Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch post on “their” Web forums, reflected in how processes of categorization, self-enhancement, and identification are shaped by the ebb and flow of incidents over time. After an incident, debaters clearly feel the urge to express their view: participation on the Web forums increases and for the Moroccan forum even doubles. People “talk” much more in terms of the conflicting groups – Muslims, Jews, Moroccans, ethnic Dutch, etc. – which enhances their inclination to define themselves as a member of one of these groups – “I as Muslim,” “I as a Dutch.” Incidents bring group membership forcefully to the psychological foreground, such that Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch are faced with a threatened group identity. Consequently, group members reveal the urge to defend or “repair” their threatened group identity and the debates boil down to a few stereotypical characteristics fueled by strong emotional loadings to differentiate between the loved in-group and the hated out-group. In relying on such stereotypes people express a maximum of meaning with a minimal amount of words and that is exactly what the behavioral pattern reveals: after an incident, both Dutch Muslims and ethnic Dutch put up more postings while using less words. Increasing ferocity of the debates can be inferred from the emotional loading: ethnic Dutch refer more often to fear and anger after an incident, while hate and anger figure more prominently in the postings of the Dutch Muslims. Remarkably, the number of emotions mentioned rises much more on Marokko.NL than on NL.politiek. Hence, radicalizing public debates are inherently emotional, the more so for Dutch Muslims. The content also sharpens: extreme issues and extreme actors become the central targets of the debates, although much stronger for Dutch Muslims than for ethnic Dutch. After intergroup incidents, Moroccans apparently feel a much stronger urge to air their views than do ethnic Dutch, and they do this in more extreme terms with a stronger emotional loading. Why would the Dutch Muslim debate radicalize more than the ethnic Dutch debate?
Why the Dutch Muslim debate radicalizes more than the ethnic Dutch debate
Our study reveals three escalating mechanisms which may explain why subordinate groups radicalize more than dominant groups: (1) Dutch Muslims, the subordinate group, show stronger identification processes than the dominant ethnic Dutch; (2) extremist entrepreneurs fruitfully mobilize consensus on extreme issues and the emotions of subordinate groups; (3) a so-called fear–hate spiral strengthens these effects. 
The first mechanism rootes in the fact that members of subordinate groups identify more strongly with their in-group than do members of dominant groups (cf. Gurin, Peng, Lopez, & Nagda, 1999). As a consequence, they interpret the socio-political context more likely in terms of friends and foes than do members of dominant groups. Friends are described in warm, positive terms, while foes are described in heated, negative terms. As identification processes spur radicalization, the strong identification of members of subordinate groups can be seen as the first escalating mechanism to radicalization. 
The second mechanism roots in the politicization of the conflict. The group conflict is augmented by involving society (or even the world) at large and the groups politicize (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Dominant and subordinate groups seem to involve different “polarization entrepreneurs.” The dominant ethnic Dutch attempt to involve particularly Islamophobic politicians (Fortuyn, Hirsi Ali, Verdonk, and Wilders), whereas subordinate Muslims address extremists that used violence, like the murderer of Van Gogh, Mohammed B., and the alleged leader of a terrorist cell, Samir A. The political entrepreneurs of the dominant group and the entrepreneurs of the subordinate group may have played a central – albeit different – role in feeding the escalatory dynamic in the conflict. After incidents the dominant group seems to retreat into its comfort zone, while the subordinate group radicalizes and becomes more and more entrenched in the Islamic–Western identity conflict. 
The third mechanism stems from the emotional loading of the respective debates. The “attacked” dominant group is fearful, whereas the “attackers,” i.e., the subordinate group, is full of hate. The debates of ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims on terrorism and stringent demands on new immigrants – including the emotions attached to these topics – may be two sides of the same coin. After all, in the case of a terrorist attack, the dominant ethnic Dutch have the power to take measures to minimize their fear, for instance by stronger demands on new immigrants; these more stringent measures in turn evoke hatred from the vulnerable subordinate Dutch Muslims. They in turn become motivated to act against the hated dominant ethnic Dutch, so making the dominant ethnic Dutch more fearful again. Such fear–hate spirals may play a central role in feeding the escalatory dynamic of intergroup radicalization and polarization. 
In documenting how ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims talk about the same identity-relevant incidents, we bring two strands of literature together. On the one hand, identity processes underlying intergroup conflict are observed from the dominant group’s point of view, focusing for instance on ethnic competition and prejudice. On the other hand, they are studied from the subordinate group’s point of view, focusing on stigmatization and discrimination. Our findings suggest that it is fruitful to integrate the two literatures; dominant and subordinate groups discuss similar identity-threatening events, but each from their specific vantage point. Consequently, identity threats are differently “repaired” by members of dominant and subordinate groups, and the three escalating mechanisms explain why the chances are greater that the public debates of subordinate rather than dominant groups radicalize. 
To Conclude
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the online debates themselves. We analyzed online debates over a period of two and a half year as a looking-glass through which intergroup relations between ethnic Dutch and Dutch Muslims were observed. This raises questions on the relation between online virtual life and offline real life. Are these opposing forums a digital reflection of – or even part of – radicalizing public debates? Can changes in the online debates be seen as a mirror-image of a hardening or radicalizing societal climate in the wider society? Are they an accurate reflection of changes in the offline societal climate? On another important matter, public debates do not merely discuss (multicultural) society, they also have an important influence on that same society. Particularly, debates in national media (newspapers, weekly magazines, radio, and television) have a stronger social impact than debates in parliament or the content of policy documents or party programs (Prins & Slijper, 2002). However, voices of marginalized groups are virtually completely excluded from these media. Compared to traditional media, the Internet is said to be particularly suited for marginalized groups to voice their viewpoints in public debate. Whether these online opportunities also lead to a more nuanced picture of Muslims and Islam among members of the Dutch public remains to be seen. On the other hand, the Internet can be viewed as a radicalizing force itself, precisely because everyone can express themselves freely. Are the online public debates a sign of marginalized groups engaging in deliberative democratic participation or do they mainly polarize intergroup relations? Our study is a first cautious step in observing online rather than offline intergroup relations. We sincerely hope that it stimulates other scholars to address the questions we have raised on the complex but timely relation between online and offline intra- and intergroup behavior.
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Table 13.1 Emotions and identification per actor or issue for both forums (number of hits per 10,000 words and percentages)

	Attention for 	Anger	Hate	Fear	Total emotions	Total emotions	Categorization	Identification


































































^1	  This is probably due to external censorship by the Dutch judiciary. NL.politiek is not moderated (there is no internal censorship), which sometimes leads to heated and insulting discussions.
^2	  The correlations for NL.politiek between these data columns in Table 13.1 are respectively 0.79 and 0.44; for Marokko.NL they are respectively 0.48 and 0.53.
